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The aim of this paper is to highlight key advances in the cognitive-behavioural treatment of obsessive 
compulsive disorder over the course of Professor Lars Goran Öst’s illustrious career. The paper will 
focus on three specific areas of interest: the treatment of obsessions, compulsive checking and the fear 
of contamination. It will also highlight recent advances concerning the broader need to ensure that 
treatment is acceptable. An increase in acceptability could result in improvements in completion rates 
so that more patients benefit from the recent improvements in the science and therapy for this 
disabling disorder.  






In a keynote address to the British Association of Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 
in London in 2011, Professor Lars Goran Öst gave a typically thorough and scholarly review of the 
efficacy of the psychological treatment of anxiety disorders over the past 20 years and their 
implementation in clinical practice. One of his key findings was that the effect sizes for the treatment 
of anxiety disorders, including obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), had not increased over this 
time. This finding is sad but unsurprising. The results of the first Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) 
to evaluate the effects of a psychological therapy for OCD, reported in 1979 (Rachman et al., 1979), 
showed significant but moderate improvements and the results of the latest 3-site RCT were not 
appreciably superior (Foa et al., 2005).  
Despite the disappointing stability of success rates, there have been advances in our 
understanding of anxiety disorders and associated therapeutic interventions. This paper will focus on 
three such advances in OCD. First, we are now able to successfully treat obsessions. This form of 
OCD would historically have been an exclusion criterion for trials involving the evaluation of 
exposure and response prevention. Second, in recent years, we have begun to understand and 
formulate compulsive checking, resulting in interventions that include attention to cognitive biases 
and metamemory. Finally, treatment for the fear of contamination can now help people who feel 
contaminated by their own thoughts, images and memories. This paper will review progress in each of 
these areas, and conclude with a comment on new ideas and data that may help increase the 
proportion of clients who enter and complete therapy. 
Obsessions 
To meet diagnostic criteria for OCD, an individual must experience recurrent, egodystonic, 
repugnant obsessions or excessive, ritualistic compulsive behaviors (APA, 1994). Although the 
majority of patients with OCD have both obsessions and compulsions, 20-25% of patients are thought 
to have obsessions without overt compulsive behaviour (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997). Some of these 
will have internal compulsions and will engage in covert mental neutralising which appears to be 
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similar to overt compulsive behaviour (de Silva, Menzies & Shafran, 2003). Others, however, will be 
suffering from obsessional thoughts, images and impulses in the absence of any neutralising 
behaviour. This emphasis on exposure and response prevention is problematic for clients with 
obsessions. The treatment traditionally involved exposure to the obsession using imaginal or in vivo 
exposure to obsessions on loop tapes. Such interventions are long, typically produce high levels of 
anxiety, can be difficult to tolerate, and have been shown to be of limited benefit when used in 
isolation (Salkovskis & Westbrook, 1989). Obsessions are essentially a cognitive phenomenon and 
cognitive interventions may be a preferable alternative to exposure and response prevention. 
The cognitive analysis of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985) paved the way for a new understanding of 
the persistence of obsessions in the absence of compulsions. It was suggested that what was critical in 
the aetiology and maintenance of obsession was the person’s appraisal of normal unwanted intrusive 
thoughts as indicating that the person was responsible for harm.  
The cognitive analysis was helpful in focusing attention on appraisals, and it inspired a 
number of subsequent investigations into the role of cognitive biases in the maintenance of 
psychopathology. One of these was thought-action fusion. Thought-action fusion has two 
components. The first is the belief that thinking about harm coming to others increases the likelihood 
they will actually come to harm, and the other is that thinking about harming others is almost as 
immoral as actually harming them (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996). Biases concerning the 
close inter-relationship between appraisals of threat, probablility and control (Moulding, Kyrios & 
Doran, 2007) were identified. A series of elegant studies by David A Clark and Christine Purdon 
highlighted the importance of addressing beliefs about the importance of controlling thoughts (Purdon 
& Clark, 1994; Purdon & Clark, 2002). An important ‘omission-commission’ bias was identified in 
which patients with OCD were found to equate situations when they failed to prevent harm and 
situations where they actual caused harm. To bring the work together, the Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group was formed, in which six beliefs domains of OCD were rationally 
determined (control of thoughts, importance of thoughts, responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty, 
overestimation of threat and perfection. Three key interpretations were proposed to be fundamental in 
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the maintenance of OCD. These were (i) the importance of thoughts, (ii) the control of thoughts and 
(iii) responsibility. The group produced a measure to assess such beliefs and interpretations in patients 
(OCCWG 2003, 2005).  
At the same time, a cognitive theory of obsessions was developed and subsequently 
elaborated (Rachman, 1997, 1998). The cognitive theory of obsessions states that obsessions are 
caused when the person makes catastrophic misinterpretations of the personal significance of his/her 
unwanted, intrusive, repugnant thoughts. A number of treatment interventions derived from the 
theory. Critical to the theory was the notion that the content of obsessions is not random, and that 
hypervigilance for threat can explain the frequency of obsessions in the absence of compulsive 
behaviour. 
The first RCT on the treatment of obsessive thoughts with 29 patients was published at 
around this time (Freeston et al. 1997) with a wait-list comparison. As that research was conducted 
prior to development of the cognitive theory of obsessions and the work on biases and beliefs, the 
fundamental component of treatment was imaginal exposure (i.e., loop tape exposure to the 
obsession) although some cognitive strategies were included.  Two-thirds of the participants did well 
immediately after the lengthy 40 hour treatment and just over half the participants maintained their 
gains at 6 month follow-up. A promising case series using cognitive therapy without exposure was 
subsequently published (Freeston, Leger & Ladouceur, 2001). Taken together, the results indicated 
that obsessions can be successfully treated. More than a decade after the cognitive theory of 
obsessions was published (such research is never quick and requires the patience of someone like Lars 
Goran Öst), a RCT for the treatment of primary obsessions in 73 patients based on the theory of the 
persistence of obsessional problems reported an effect size of d = 2.34 on the obsessions subscale of 
the Y-BOCS for those who completed treatment (Whittal, McLean, Rachman & Robichaud, 2010). In 
a previous study by the authors on the treatment of OCD, an effect size of d = 1.84 was reported for 
exposure and respone prevention (Whittal, Thordardson & McLean, 2005). The study on the 
persistence of obsessional problems found stress management training was also effective in the 
treatment of obsessions (Whittal et al, 2010). The stress management training involved identifying 
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stressful areas of the patient’s life and providing skills training following a modular approach, 
individualized to the participant.  Typically treatment began with applied relaxation (Öst, 1987). The 
study concluded that primary obsessions should no longer be considered to be resistant to treatment, 
representing a major advance in the field. 
Compulsive Checking 
The hallmark of a scholarly clinical researcher like Lars Goran Öst is to subject research 
findings that are incongruous with the observation of the clinical phenomenon to rigorous scientific 
scrutiny and conservative interpretations of the data. For many years, it has been suggested that OCD 
can be considered as a neurological deficit (see Tallis, 1997 for a review). The proponents of this 
argument explain compulsive checking as a problem in memory based on performance on 
neuropsychological assessments. The difficulty with this argument is that the apparent memory deficit 
in people with OCD has always appeared highly specific – they do not have problems with their 
memory in general. In addition, ask anyone with a contamination fear how an object became 
contaminated, they will tell you in exquisite detail about an event that might have happened more than 
20 years previously. In the past ten years, we have gained a greater understanding into the functioning 
of the memories of people with OCD which has, in turn, led to advances in the treatment methods 
available. 
A cognitive theory of compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002) was developed to try to better 
understand the nature and persistence of the problem. The cognitive model of compulsive checking 
comprises three major elements, namely inflated sense of responsibility, gross over-estimations of the 
probability of a misfortune and over-estimated expectations of the seriousness of the misfortune. The 
model proposes that compulsive checking is self-perpetuating because it (i) increases perceived 
responsibility (although patients are checking to try to reduce responsibility), (ii) increases perceived 
danger (again, in opposition to the patient’s intention), and (iii) impairs meta-memory (i.e., 
knowledge about the contents and regulation of memory). The last of these putative self-perpetuating 
mechanisms has become the subject of research studies into the impact of repeated checking. A series 
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of elegant studies, led by Marcel van den Hout  and Merel Kindt (2003a, 2003b, 2004) demonstrated 
that repeated checking of virtual objects by nonclinical participants reliably leads to significant 
decreases in memory confidence, vividness and detail; memory accuracy was unaffected. The 
findings were replicated for the repeated checking of real, possibly threatening objects in 
undergraduate students (Coles, Radomsky & Horng, 2006; Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault, 2006), 
for mental checking (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010) and for checking using perseverative, 
compulsive-like staring (van den Hout et al., 2008, 2009).  
One of the hallmarks of clinical research in OCD is that experimental studies such as those 
conducted by van den Hout and colleagues become incorporated into treatment methods. Cognitive 
behaviour therapy for OCD has for many years involved normalising intrusive thoughts, conducting 
exposure and response prevention and observation of the spontaneous decay of anxiety – all of these 
originated from experimental research (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). The experimental work on 
compulsive checking is no different, and can now be incorporated into therapy in the form of 
behavioural experiments (Radomsky, Shafran, Coughtrey & Rachman, 2010). The repetition and 
memory confidence behavioural experiment has particularly high evidential value. Patients are asked 
to contrast the impact of checking on their confidence in memory, vividness and detail as well as their 
estimates of responsibility and danger when they check repeatedly and when they check once. For the 
vast majority of patients, the research findings are replicated in the therapy room; they find out that 
repeated checking causes memory distrust. Patients report that they become confused after repeated 
checking and their uncertainty as to whether an object is switched off increases. The minority who do 
not find that their confidence in memory is affected by repeated checking, typically find there is no 
difference in their metamemory when they check once compared to when they check repeatedly. The 
experiment allows such patients to conclude that repeated checking does not aid their memory and is 
taking up time that could be spent more fruitfully. Similar behavioural experiments stem from 
experimental manipulations of beliefs about memory (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011), showing that the 
belief that one has a poor memory can cause urges to check. 
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Behavioural experiments are probably the key intervention in advanced CBT for OCD. The 
experiment on compulsive checking naturally gives rise to discussions about how estimates of danger 
and responsibility are influenced by checking but also by other variables such as anxiety. In the mid 
1990s, the cognitive bias of thought-action fusion was a particular topic of interest. The development 
of a measure of thought-action fusion followed by an experimental analysis of its role in the 
maintenance of psychopathology spawned a multitude of studies that demonstrated this is a common 
bias across anxiety disorders (Shafran et al., 1996). Clients who believe strongly that their thoughts 
can cause harm to others (‘Likelihood thought-action fusion) are now able to have their concerns 
quickly recognised and addressed. Therapists typically start by asking their patients to start by 
wishing harm on them to demonstrate the veracity that the patient’s thoughts can cause harm, and then 
gradually build up to testing the belief that their thoughts can cause harm to loved ones. Normalising 
thought-action fusion and evaluating the belief is a cornerstone of therapy for those who have such a 
cognitive bias, even if they have held it for many years. How such biases interact with compulsive 
checking allows a range of therapeutic interventions. For example, the bias of likelihood thought-
action fusion increases perceived responsibility for harm; perceived responsibility for harm increases 
patients’ estimates of the likelihood of harm and seriousness of harm (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995); 
these ‘multipliers’ lead directly to compulsive checking which serves to increase rather than decrease 
responsibility, thereby maintaining a vicious cycle. Such an understanding of the processes involved 
in repeated checking is followed by personal demonstrations of how such processes work for the 
individual patient,  and subsequent interventions to address the biases and counter-productive 
checking behaviour (Radomsky et al., 2010).  
Fear of Contamination 
The widely used technique of exposure and response prevention (repeated, prolonged 
exposures to the contaminants delivered in a graded hierarchy), is moderately effective but can be 
difficult to tolerate. It was easier to do such behavioural work with contamination in the clinic than it 
was with the checking concerns which were notoriously difficult to elicit outside the patient’s own 
situation (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). The view of the 1970s and 1980s that a contamination fear 
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overlapped significantly with a simple phobia was consistent with this being perhaps the most 
straightforward form of OCD. This approach overlooked the clinical phenomenon in which patients 
were reporting feeling contaminated in the absence of contact with a contaminant. In 1994, the 
phenomenon was described clearly as ‘pollution of the mind’ but it took another decade before the 
construal of the fear of contamination (Rachman, 2004; Rachman, 2006) incorporated the occurrence 
of mental contamination.  
 Mental contamination is defined as the ‘feeling of being polluted, dirtied, infected or 
endangered in the absence of a physical contaminant.’ It arises from physical, emotional or moral 
violations, and is associated with impurity, immorality, betrayal and humiliation. Such contamination 
is triggered by thoughts, memories or images. A particular form of mental contamination was 
identified in which the patient fears taking on the undesirable characteristics of others. This fear of 
morphing, or transformation obsessions, appeared relatively common in clinical practice yet was 
seldom discussed (Voltz & Heyman, 2007). 
 A comparison of contact contamination and mental contamination is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Comparison of contact contamination and mental contamination 
Contact contamination Mental contamination 
Feelings evoked instantly with physical contact 
 
Physical contact not necessary for      
contamination 
Generated by contact with external stimuli Can be generated internally (e.g., thoughts, 
memories, and images) 
Contaminants are dirty or harmful substances Primary source is not a substance, but almost 
always a person 
Others considered vulnerable 
 
Uniquely vulnerable 
Lacks a moral element 
 
Moral element common 
Transiently responsive to cleaning 
 
Cleaning is often ineffective 




 Of note, mental contamination can be provoked by ‘mental events’ such as memories, images 
and remarks. The feelings of contamination are not localised on the hands. They are diffuse and 
usually include feelings of internal dirtiness and /or pollution.  The source of the contamination is 
human, not inanimate objects, and is caused by emotional and/or physical violations. 
As with the majority of developments in the field of OCD, the construct of mental 
contamination arose from clinical observation but was soon followed by experimental analyses and 
treatment development. A ‘dirty kiss’ paradigm was developed in which it was demonstrated that 
women asked to imagine experiencing a non-consensual kiss experienced greater subjective feelings 
of dirtiness, a greater urge to wash, and are more likely to spontaneously wash their mouths than those 
asked to imagine experiencing a consensual one (Fairbrother, Newth & Rachman, 2005; Herba, 
2005). Following a sexual violation, 60% of victims reported increased mental pollution and 
excessive washing (Fairbrother & Rachman, 2004).  
These initial experimental paradigms confounded recalling an episode in which there was 
some physical contact with mental contamination, but other paradigms have reported similar findings 
that feelings of contamination arise in the absence of physical contact. After recalling unethical 
memories or copying immoral stories, non-clinical participants were found to be more likely to 
complete word fragments to produce washing related words, choose antiseptic wipes over pencils and 
rate cleaning products as more desirable (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). An adaptation of the cued recall 
test using words such as disgust, humiliate, shame, betrayed, immoral, dirty, contaminated, immoral 
and impure was given to 40 students. After such a task, participants felt significantly higher levels of 
state anxiety, general dirtiness, internal dirtiness and urge to wash (Coughtrey, Shafran & Rachman, 
submitted). In the bathroom break, 17.5 % washed their hands, 45% had a drink of water and 25 % 
used an antibacterial handwipe.  
Contemporaneous with the experimental research, the development of a self-report measures 
of mental contamination, contamination sensitivity and contamination thought-action fusion were 
underway (Radomsky, Rachman, Elliot & Shafran, in preparation). The scales were found to be 
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internally consistent and convergent validity was demonstrated. The mental contamination scale was 
subsequently completed by people with significant obsessive compulsive symptoms or a formal 
diagnosis of OCD (Coughtrey, Shafran, Knibbs & Rachman, 2012). In one of the studies of 54 
patients with OCD, 44% scored highly on the measure of mental contamination indicating that such a 
problem was common. The severity of mental contamination was positively associated with severity 
of OCD symptoms and Thought Action Fusion.  Of the 32 patients with contamination fears, 56% 
reported both mental and contact contamination, 19% had mental contamination only, and 25% had 
contact contamination only. 
The identification of mental contamination by means of a self-report measure to assess 
severity, and the finding that concurrent contact and mental contamination was the norm, was 
accompanied by the development of specific therapeutic interventions to address mental 
contamination (Coughtrey, Shafran, Lee & Rachman, 2012). Particular adaptations include 
assessment of violations and betrayals and the mechanism by which mental contamination is spread; 
the meaning of contamination, contamination-related images, and an emphasis on the stability of the 
construct of the self for those with morphing fears. The findings from a case series of 12 participants, 
all of whom had failed to respond to standard CBT for OCD, were encouraging with seven of the 12 
no longer meeting diagnostic criteria for OCD.  During the development and presentation of this 
work, the question arose of whether this was truly ‘new’ and an advance as such patients had been 
present in the clinic for decades. While it is undoubtedly true that the clinical phenomenon is not new, 
our understanding of the processes involved in mental contamination and the associated treatment 
interventions means that there is now hope that an effective treatment can be provided to patients who 
were previously overlooked. 
Treatment Acceptability 
There are too few treatment trials for OCD, and there is a consensus amongst clinical 
researchers that there are serious obstacles to conducting a treatment trial comparing ‘new, advanced 
CBT for OCD’ which we describe above with exposure and response prevention. The sample size 
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would need to be in the high hundreds for enough power to detect the differences between these two 
active therapies. Second, there is the view that few therapists currently conduct exposure and response 
prevention in its purest form, using systematic, prolonged graded exposure based on the habituation 
model in which patients are never asked what they were thinking, what they have learned from the 
exposure and in which the content of the exposure is irrelevant. When conducting exposure and 
response prevention, there is typically psychoeducation about the nature of anxiety and the therapist 
would encourage patients to think about what they learned from the exposure and response prevention 
exercises. When doing CBT, behavioural experiments typically involve some minimal form of 
exposure but it is neither repeated nor prolonged.  
The few treatment trials reveal a consistent finding - attrition rates for existing therapies are 
unacceptably high. The prevailing treatments (exposure and response prevention) is so demanding 
that many people find it difficult to tolerate. In the large 3-site trial reported in 2005, 833 potential 
participants were screened. Of these, 520 were offered treatment but no fewer than 372 of them 
refused. 134 of these 372 (36%)  refused due to the treatment offered and the remainder declined to 
participate for other reasons. Attrition after inclusion and randomization was mainly due to refusal of 
ERP and Clomipramine (mean attrition rate was 29%).  Of the 142 patients who were assigned to a 
treatment condition, 36 dropped out, leaving only 122 completers out of the original sample of 520 
(Foa et al, 2005). Other worrying results about the clinical reality of treatment for OCD were 
compiled by Houghton et al (2010). Perhaps the biggest advance, then, is to consider ways to increase 
the acceptability of treatment without compromising efficacy. One such way may be to be less 
dogmatic regarding the counter-productive effects of safety behaviour, which can be considered as 
actions, thoughts or protective objects used by anxious individuals to prevent or minimize feared 
catastrophe’ (Salkovskis, 1996) 
It is undoubtedly the case that some safety behaviours are unhelpful. For example, patients 
with social phobia who rehearse each word before verbalising it or who avoid eye contact come 
across as peculiar from a social interaction perspective. People with health anxiety who repeatedly 
seek reassurance and medical tests are likely to find that such behaviour exacerbates and maintains 
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their concerns about their health. All of these behaviours would be appropriate targets for treatment. 
Nevertheless, there are some safety behaviours that may actually be helpful insofaras they encourage 
patients to obtain information that could disconfirm their fears. Such patients would not countenance 
the idea of seeking out such information without their safety behaviour. For example, someone with 
OCD may be spending hours ordering and arranging for fear that ‘something bad’ will happen if 
objects were out of place. A therapist might suggest taking a photograph of the objects after 10 
minutes of ordering and arranging that the patient can subsequently refer to if anxious while out. Such 
a photograph would enable the patient to do a behavioural experiment to see what happens if the 
patient does not order/arrange for more than 10 minutes whereas otherwise they may not do the 
experiment. Does the patient become dependent on the photograph? Is the therapist simply replacing 
one compulsion with another? Our clinical experience suggests not, and some recent experimental 
data is consistent with that. Using a subclinical sample, an experiment comparing exposure plus 
response prevention with exposure plus safety behaviour found few significant differences in the 
efficacy of the interventions – the presence of safety behaviour did not prevent reduction in fear, 
contamination, danger, disgust (Rachman, Shafran, Radomsky & Zysk, 2011; van den Hout, 
Englehard, Toffolo & van Uijen, 2011). Other experiments have shown that the judicious use of 
safety behaviour did not prevent declines in fear (Hood, Antony, Koerner & Monson, 2010; Milosevic 
& Radomsky, 2008) as well as failing to prevent the acquisition of helpful information (Milosevic & 
Radomsky, in press). Aside from the reality that it is hard for patients to drop their safety behaviour 
(McManus, Sacadura & Clark, 2008), recent research indicates that significantly more patients with 
anxiety disorders find a therapy that incorporates safety behaviour more acceptable than one that does 
not (Milosevic & Radomsky, in press), and that the use of safety behaviour can foster significantly 
closer approach to a contaminant (Levy & Radomsky, under review). We suggest that allowing 
patients to use safety behaviour in a judicious manner represents both a practical and ethical advance 






We have chosen to focus on four areas in the treatment of OCD in which we feel there have 
been specific advances over the course of Lars Goran Öst’s career. We have chosen to focus on these 
areas as they are our particular areas of expertise, but there are, of course, advances in other areas of 
CBT for OCD including excellent work on imagery (Speckens, Hackmann, Ehlers & Cuthbert, 2007), 
looming vulnerability (Riskind, Rector & Cassin, 2011), therapies such as telephone treatment, 
internet-delivered therapy and self help (Andersson et al., 2012; Haug, Nordgreen, Öst & Havik, 
2012; Lovell et al.,2004; Wootton et al., 2011), work on controlling thoughts (e.g., Purdon, Rowa & 
Antony, 2005) and on other obsessive beliefs (e.g., Bradbury, Cassin & Rector, 2011). Work on ‘not 
just right experiences’ in OCD is progressing (e.g., Coles, Heimberg, Frost & Steketee, 2005) as is the 
latest thinking on hoarding and its specific (or non-specific) relationship with obsessional problems 
(Abramowitz, Wheaton & Storch, 2008). Changing how therapy is delivered so that it is more 
acceptable and feasible for young people is a promising avenue to help increase completion rates that 
warrants further exploration (Whiteside, Brown, & Abramowitz, 2008)  
Such advances are not reflected in outcome studies demonstrating the superiority of CBT for 
OCD over behaviour therapy. They are, however, reflected in the fact that there are now freely 
available psychometrically robust measures and effective treatments for groups of people whose 
problems are essentially cognitive and whose treatment required a cognitive analysis. Such people 
include those with pure obsessions, whose checking compulsions are perpetuated by cognitive biases 
and the impact of checking on metamemory, the large number of patients who feel contaminated in 
the absence of contact and the patients for whom ordering and arranging is driven by appraisals of 
responsibility. Finally, we hope that therapy can become increasingly acceptable and gentle over time, 
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